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This paper presents a dynamic principal-agent analysis of an incentive
 system for Salmonella control in 
the pork supply chain.  The incentive
 system determines quality premiums to the producer,
 testing 
frequencies for hogs delivered, as well as charges to
 the producer for testing and penalties.  Using cost 
estimates
 and technical parameters, we evaluate the cost effectiveness of plant and farm control 
measures and trade-offs between prevalence reduction and related costs and gains. We also assess the 
impact of ownership structure on
 incentive system parameters and performance for a wide range of 
prevalence threshold levels.  Differences in control actions, bacteriological prevalence and the overall 
welfare gain for the chain are very small across ownership structures.  Changes in the prevalence 
threshold level lead to substantial changes in the use of farm and plant control packages and 
performance measures.  
 




Consumers in developed countries take an interest in the way their food is produced. Besides 
ethical issues and convenience considerations, consumers are concerned about health risks from food 
borne illnesses. By far the most frequently reported zoonotic diseases in humans are salmonellosis and 
campylobacteriosis. In 2004, a total of 192,703 cases of salmonellosis were reported the EU Member 
States. The incidence was 42.2 cases per 100,000 of population (European Food Safety Authority, 
2006). A substantial share of the finishing pigs herds are infected with Salmonella (van der Wolf et al.,   3 
2001). Infection of pigs with Salmonella can occur on the farm. Pigs can also be infected during 
transport and lairage, and meat can be contaminated during slaughter.  One out of four cases of human 
salmonellosis is caused by a serotype occurring in pigs (van Pelt and Valkenburg, 2001).  Therefore, 
pork can be regarded as an important source of food borne salmonellosis. 
Starting in 2008, it will be mandatory for all member states of the European Union to test pork 
and pork products for all Salmonella serotypes with public health significance and to certify such 
products for trade. To meet these statutory demands, each country will be required to implement a 
control program in the pork supply chain. But there is a need for more information on the cost 
effectiveness of control measures and on trade-offs between prevalence reduction and related gains and 
costs. 
Trade-offs in pork and dairy chains are reported for a wide range of food safety measures (van 
der Gaag, 2004a; Valeeva et al., 2006).  At present, however, pork supply chains in most European 
countries have neither a formal control system that spans the entire chain nor payment differentials 
based on Salmonella contamination.  A mandatory Salmonella control program has already been in 
place in Denmark since 1995. Its main focus is on Salmonella control in the primairy production.  The 
Dutch pork chain has no differentiation in payments to producers with respect to the contamination of 
the product with Salmonella, so there is no direct incentive for producers to reduce the Salmonella 
prevalence.   
Nielsen et al. (2005) analysed the cost effectiveness of the Danish Salmonella control program. 
They concluded that further on-farm initiatives cannot reduce the Salmonella prevalence in Danish 
pork sufficiently. Only intensified focus on slaughterhouse measures can further reduce the prevalence 
of Salmonella in pork (Alban and Goldbach, 2005). The Dutch pig industry focuses on developing   4 
private quality control systems which can qualify for less intensive public control for Salmonella and 
other food related hazards by inspectors of the government (de Bakker, 2007).  
This paper presents results of an analysis of an incentive system for Salmonella control in a two 
segment pork supply chain.  The model described here is a direct extension of  a dynamic principal-
agent model developed by King, Backus, and van der Gaag (2007) that allows for explicit 
consideration of the producer’s performance history in controlling serological Salmonella herd 
prevalence.  In this study we add the possibility of plant control measures that reduce bacteriological 
Salmonella carcass prevalence.  The producer incentive system determines Salmonella testing 
frequencies for pigs delivered to the slaughter plant, as well as charges to the producer for testing and 
penalties for substandard Salmonella control.  Plant level control measures are one-time investments 
made at the time the plant chooses parameters for the producer incentive system.  Using cost estimates 
and technical parameters based on Dutch experts and Danish data, we use the model to evaluate the 
cost effectiveness of plant and farm control measures and trade-offs between prevalence reduction and 
related costs and gains.  We also assess the impact of ownership structure on
 performance for a wide 
range of prevalence threshold levels. 
 
2.  Salmonella testing procedures and control measures  
Pork can become contaminated with Salmonella in different ways, and at different points in the 
pork supply chain. Control measures to decrease the risk from Salmonella contamination should be 
considered on the farm and at the slaughterhouse (Beloeil et al., 2004).   
Two types of testing, serological and bacteriological, are used to assess Salmonella prevalence. 
Serological tests determine the level of Salmonella antibodies in blood samples typically taken at 
slaughter.  Serological sampling of finishing herds is possible at the farm or at the slaughterhouse,   5 
since the serological status does not change after pigs leave the farm. Bacteriological tests determine 
whether Salmonella bacteria are present in manure or in a tissue sample from a carcass. The 
bacteriological testing of carcasses is the most important  indicator for food safety. 
The plant’s bacteriological prevalence level is related to farm-level serological prevalence 
levels.  In general, bacteriological prevalence levels are lower than serological prevalence levels 
because (i) serological prevalence often indicates a past infection that is no longer active and (ii) 
control measures taken at the plant level may influence bacteriological contamination on carcasses by 
contributing to or minimizing cross-contamination.   
The relation between herd serology and the prevalence of Salmonella bacteria measured at the 
carcass surface is described for three Danish abbatoirs by a 1.4% increase in the probability of 
Salmonella positive carcasses for a 10 percentage point increase in herd serological prevalence. The 
Spearmann correlation between carcass prevalence and serological prevalence was 0.29 (Sorensen et 
al., 2004). Swanenburg et al. (2001a) report also that the prevalence of Salmonella lower is in pork 
samples of sero-negative herds than in samples of sero-positive herds  
Salmonella contamination of carcasses after slaughter is partially caused by Salmonella-
infected herds that were slaughtered before, and partially by residential flora of the slaughterhouse. 
Slaughter hygiene, including careful removal of the intestinal tract from the carcass and cleaning and 
disinfection, can reduce cross-contamination by residential flora from the slaughterline. The carcass 
splitter in the slaughter line is the most important contamination source for carcasses of pigs from both 
sero-negative and sero-positive herds. Logistic slaughter, or separate slaughter of sero-negative pig 
herds, can also be useful to decrease the Salmonella prevalence of pork after slaughter (Swanenburg et 
al., 2001b).    6 
 
3. Model Description 
The model developed for this study is a direct extension of the dynamic principal-agent model 
presented in King, Backus, and van der Gaag (2007), and our description here draws heavily on the 
description in that paper (pp. 85-92).  That model identifies Nash equilibrium farmer incentive system 
parameters and associated farm-level Salmonella control policies for a two segment supply chain that 
includes producers and a slaughter plant.  The model described here adds the possibility of plant 
control measures that reduce bacteriological Salmonella prevalence.  
Of the two incentive systems described in King , Backus, and van der Gaag (2007), we use the 
cumulative experience system in this analysis.  The parties in control under IOF and COOP ownership 
structures have a uniform preference for the cumulative experience system. That is due largely to lower 
testing costs. Consistent with results presented by Starbird (2005), a random testing regime makes it 
possible to reduce testing costs without sacrificing product quality. 
We assume a homogeneous group of hog producers, each of whom is treated as an independent 
agent in the model developed for this study.  Each producer delivers a fixed number of hogs once each 
month to a slaughter plant that has a Salmonella control program.  All producers have identical costs 
for inputs not related to Salmonella control, PC, and receive an identical base price, PH, per hog 
delivered.  They also receive a producer quality premium, α0, per hog delivered that is a reward for 
participation in the plant’s Salmonella control program.  Each month, the producer chooses one 
package from a set of three Salmonella control measure packages, xt ˛ {x1, x2, x3}, with an associated 
cost, c(xt), that increases with the intensity of the control measures.  At slaughter, a sample of the 
producer’s hogs may be serologically tested for Salmonella prevalence, prevt ˛{0, 10, 20, …, 100}.  
The probability distribution of prevalence levels is a function of the current Salmonella control package   7 
and is denoted by the discrete probability function h(prevt|xt).
1  If hogs are tested, the test results 
become part of the producer’s production history, which is summarized by a production history 
indicator level, t R , a scalar defined as the number of consecutive months (up to a maximum of α1 ˛{0, 
1, 2, …, 24}) the producer has delivered hogs prior to the current period without having a Salmonella 
prevalence test level exceeding the Salmonella serological threshold level, α7 ˛{10, 20, 30, 40}, set by 
the slaughter plant. 
The probability that the producer’s hogs will be tested on delivery,  ) ( t R t , declines as  t R   
increases according to the following relationship: 
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where α2 is the maximum probability of being tested, α3 is a testing probability reduction parameter, 
and α4 is the minimum probability of being tested.  The evolution of the production history indicator is 
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where Testt is a binary variable equal to one if the producer’s hogs are tested in period t and zero 
otherwise, and Fail(xt) is a binary variable equal to one if the producer’s hogs are tested in period t and 
                                                 
1 We assume the prevalence of Salmonella at t=1 is independent of prevalence at t=0.  Field tests reveal a low correlation 
between consecutive monthly prevalence test results.  However, there is some evidence that a low on-farm Salmonella 
prevalence at t=0 is associated with a higher probability of a low on-farm Salmonella prevalence at t=1.  We attribute this to 
irreversible control measures, such as investments in farm buildings and equipment aimed at improving herd health 
hygiene, which are not considered here.  Seasonal effects could also be a factor, but these are also outside the scope of our 
analysis.   8 
have a prevalence test result above the allowable threshold and zero otherwise.  Therefore, Rt+1  is a 
random variable that depends not only on the control package used by the producer but also on the 
probability of testing determined by the current production history indicator.  The probability that the 
prevalence test result will be below the plant’s Salmonella threshold level, s(xt), is calculated for each 
control package by summing values of the prevalence probability function, h(prevt|xt), over prevalence 
levels less than or equal to the Salmonella threshold, α7.  This incentive system has two additional 
parameters: α5 is the share of the expected testing cost paid by the producer , and  α6 ˛ [0,1] is the size 
of the producer penalty per hog for a prevalence test result that exceeds the plant’s Salmonella 
threshold level. The single period return for the producer,  ) , ( t t R x f , is defined by the following 
expression: 
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The producer pays the expected testing cost, regardless of whether his hogs are actually tested.  The 
producer’s choice of a Salmonella control package, xt, influences the distribution of current returns not 
only through control costs but also through its effect on the probability of paying a penalty for a 
prevalence test above the allowable threshold.  The current control package also influences future 
returns through its effect on the production history indicator level, which affects testing costs and the 
probability of having one’s hogs tested.  
The producer’s problem is solved by dynamic programming, with the Salmonella control 
package as the control variable and the production history indicator level as the state variable.  
Producers are assumed to be risk averse with an infinite planning horizon.  Preferences are represented 
by an additively time separable constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function, and the model   9 
does not allow for saving.  Producers consider the plant’s investments in Salmonella control measures 
and the incentive system to be exogenously determined and fixed.  Each period, the producer chooses a 
Salmonella control package and realizes a net gain from participation in the Salmonella control 
program that is equal to the quality premium minus costs for quality control measures and Salmonella 
testing and, possibly, a penalty for a Salmonella prevalence level that exceeds thresholds set by the 
slaughter plant.
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where E is the expectations operator, δ is a monthly discount factor and λ is the producer’s constant 
level of absolute risk aversion.  The optimal solution to this problem yields a steady state Salmonella 
control package for each production history indicator state.  The solution also yields probabilities that 
the producer will be in each state, expected control and testing costs, and expected penalties assessed to 
the producer.  If the certainty equivalent of the net gain from participation in the Salmonella control 
program falls below zero, the producer will terminate his relationship with the slaughter plant and will 
deliver his hogs to another plant that does not offer a producer quality premium because it sells its 
product in markets that do not restrict Salmonella prevalence. 
                                                 
2  Production costs not related to Salmonella control, PC, and the base price per hog, PH, are treated as deterministic in this 
analysis.  Therefore, the base net return for hog production can be treated as a fixed component of overall returns that 
include gains from participation in the Salmonella control program.  With a CARA utility function, this fixed component 
does not affect the optimal choice of a control package and so can be disregarded.   10 
The manager of the slaughter plant is treated as the principal in this model.  She cannot directly 
observe producers’ quality control efforts, but she can influence their behavior through the design of 
the compensation/testing system.  Specifically, she can choose the structure of the incentive system and 
the values of elements in the parameter vector, α, that determine the producer quality premium, testing 
probabilities, serological prevalence threshold, penalties, the incidence of testing costs, and the 
evolution of production history indicator levels.  The plant manager can also choose one package from 
a set of three Salmonella plant control measure packages, γt ˛ {γ1, γ2, γ3}, with an associated cost, 
c(γt). The slaughter plant receives an exogenously determined quality premium equivalent to QPS per 
hog from its downstream customers if the plant level mean bacteriological prevalence of Salmonella 
for all hog carcasses produced by the plant on a given day, pprev, is less than or equal to an 
exogenously determined bacteriological threshold, BPREV
*.  The plant’s bacteriological prevalence 
level, for a given plant control package, depends on the distribution of bacteriological prevalence levels 
for hogs delivered by producers.  This, in turn, is related to farm-level serological prevalence levels, 
which depend on the farm-level control measures used by producers. Therefore, the bacteriological 
prevalence measure for a group of hogs delivered by a producer, bprev, is a random variable with a 
probability function, m(bprev|prevt, γt), that is conditional on the producer’s serological prevalence 
level and the plant-level Salmonella control package. 
The slaughter plant’s bacteriological prevalence level, pprev, is a measure of the mean 
bacteriological prevalence level for all hog carcasses produced during a day.  As in King, Backus, and 
van der Gaag (2007), we assume that there are daily hog deliveries by dhogd homogeneous producers.  
Due to past random events, these producers are distributed over production history states and so may 
have used a distribution of control packages, though any individual producer will be in a single state 
and will have used a single control package.  Therefore, the population of producers will deliver hogs   11 
with a bacteriological prevalence distribution associated with the mix of control packages reflecting the 
steady state distribution of producers over production history states and the plant’s own control 
package.  Let cpi, μij, and σij
2 be the percentage of producers using control package i and the mean and 
variance of producer level bacteriological prevalence for package i, where  i ˛{1, 2, 3}, when the plant 
has selected plant control package j, where j ˛{1, 2, 3}.  Assuming producer level prevalence is 
identically and independently distributed for producers using the same control package, the plant-level 
expected bacteriological prevalence for this group of producers will be normally distributed with mean 
and variance, μSij, and σSij
2, defined by the following expressions: 
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The overall plant-level expected bacterological prevalence will also be normally distributed with mean 
and variance, μSj, and σSj
2, defined by the following expressions: 
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The plant receives no premium when the plant level prevalence in hogs delivered exceeds BPREV
*.  
Knowing the plant-level bacteriological prevalence distribution, the expected slaughter plant premium 
is the product of QPS and the probability the plant-level prevalence will be less than or equal to 
BPREV
*.  The plant pays Salmonella control costs, quality premiums to producers and Salmonella   12 
testing costs not paid for by the producers.  The plant also receives penalties assessed to producers.  
Otherwise, the plant’s processing margin per hog is fixed. 
The manager chooses a compensation/testing system, α, and plant level control package, γt, that 
optimizes her relevant performance measure, subject to producers’ optimal behavior under the 
incentive system and the participation constraint that the certainty equivalent of each producer’s 
expected net gain from participation in the Salmonella control program must be greater than or equal to 
zero.  The manager’s relevant performance measure depends on the ownership structure for the 
slaughter plant.  We consider two structures:  ownership by non-producer investors (IOF) and 
ownership by a producer cooperative (COOP). 
Under the IOF structure, the manager maximizes the plant’s expected gain from participation in 
a Salmonella control program, which is defined as the expected premium received from downstream 
customers plus expected penalties paid to the plant by producers minus plant control costs, producer 
quality premiums and Salmonella testing costs paid by the plant. Under the COOP structure, the 
manager maximizes the certainty equivalent of the representative producer’s net gain from 
participation in the Salmonella control program subject to the constraint that the plant’s expected gain 
from participation in the Salmonella control program is greater than or equal to zero. 
We also consider the case where the manager chooses incentive system parameters to maximize 
net gains from Salmonella control for the entire two segment chain (CHAIN).  In this case, which 
serves as an overall efficiency benchmark for chain operations with decentralized decision making, the 
objective is to maximize the plant’s expected quality premium minus control and testing costs.  
Penalties paid by producers to the slaughter plant are not considered explicitly in the function to be 
maximized, since they are simply within-chain transfers between parties. Because these penalties are 
stochastic and producers are risk averse, however, the incidence of penalties does indirectly affect   13 
overall chain performance.  The model accounts for this.   Optimal incentive system parameters under 
CHAIN ownership structure may not be optimal from the perspective of the producer or the plant, but 
they do maximize expected gains for the chain. 
With the behavioral assumptions in this analysis, along with the assumptions that incentive 
system parameters will be fixed over the entire planning horizon and that the manager will be honest in 
applying the incentive system parameters she chooses under a particular incentive system design and 
ownership structure, the incentive system parameters and the associated optimal Salmonella control 
policies of the plant and the producers represent a Nash equilibrium.  Given the other party’s optimal 
response, neither the producer nor the manager can be made better off by deviating from his or her 
optimal solution.  
 
4. Model Parameters 
Model parameters for this analysis are based on current conditions for hog finishing operations 
in the Netherlands, with non-Salmonella control-related variable production costs, PC, of €90.90 per 
hog and a base price, PH, of €115.00 per hog.  Each producer is assumed to deliver 200 hogs per 
month, but all analysis is done on a per-hog basis.  If hogs are tested, blood samples are analyzed for 
ten of the 200 hogs delivered.  The cost of serological testing is €2.00 per sample, so the testing cost 
for the entire group, TC, is €0.10 per hog.  The farmer’s monthly discount factor, δ, is assumed to be 
0.9967, which implies an annual discount rate of 4%.  The farmer’s constant absolute risk aversion 
level, λ, is set at 0.10, a level that implies a risk premium equal to between 4% and 6% of the expected 
net gain for the entire chain from participation in the Salmonella control program. 
The slaughter plant’s quality premium for participation in the Salmonella control program, 
QPS, is €4.25 per hog processed.  The exogenously determined threshold for the average   14 
bacteriological prevalence of hogs delivered by all producers, BPREV
*, is allowed to vary in this 
analysis from a high of 3.5% to a low of 0.5%.  
The three Salmonella control packages available to producers are those defined by King, 
Backus, and van der Gaag (2007).  They include only reversible control measures.  All three packages 
contain basic control measures like control of rodents, hygiene protocols, disinfecting and cleaning.  
Package 2 adds strict all-in/all-out procedures and separate routes for different suppliers.  Package 3 
adds acidification of feed and/or water, a highly effective but expensive measure.  Costs for farm 
control packages 1, 2 and 3 are estimated to be €0.72, €1.14, and €2.92 per hog (King Backus, and van der 
Gaag, 2007). Farm-level serological prevalence probability distributions for the three control packages 
– i.e., h(prevt|xt) – are shown in table 1.  The prevalence distribution for Package 1 is quite dispersed 
and is centered around 50%.  The distribution for Package 2 is more concentrated and has most of its 
probability mass at levels below 30%.  The distribution for Package 3 is still more concentrated at the 
lower end of the prevalence range, with the probability of a test result of zero exceeding 70%.  These 
discrete prevalence distributions are used to determine elements of the state transition matrices required 
for solution of the producer’s dynamic programming problem.   
Three plant level Salmonella control packages are considered in this study. Package 1 contains 
strict hygienic practices at slaughter & processing (cleaning and disinfection) induced by the investor 
owner or cooperative through monitoring the plant manager’s effort. Package 2 adds acidification of 
slaughter equipment in cleaning and disinfecting procedures. Package 3 adds logistic slaughter of sero-
negative pig herds. Logistic slaughter includes testing all pig herds and slaughtering positively tested 
herds either at the end of the day or at another location to reduce cross-contamination in the 
slaughterhouse. Logistic slaughter only reduces the prevalence of Salmonella effectively when the 
delay between sampling pig herds at the farm and delivery to the slaughterhouse is at a minimum.    15 
Cost estimates are based on figures provided by Dutch experts from the Vionfood company. 
The cost of monitoring the plant manager’s effort to avoid cross-contamination of carcasses are 
included in all three plant control packages and set at zero costs. The costs of plant control packages 2 
and 3 are estimated to be €0.10 and €0.40 per hog
3. 
 Bacteriological prevalence distributions for plant control package, γt, are shown in table 2. Each 
row of the probability matrix for a given plant control package is associated with a serological 
prevalence level, and each column is associated with a bacteriological prevalence level.  The matrix 
elements are bacteriological prevalence probabilities derived from a Danish study in three Danish 
abattoirs (Sorensen et al., 2004). First, a probability matrix was constructed based on odds of 1.4 for 
Salmonella positive carcasses for each 10% point increase in herd serology, together with an increasing 
dispersion of the probability distribution when serological prevalence levels increase
4. It was estimated 
that monitoring the plant manager’s effort to reduce Salmonella by the investor owner or cooperative 
results for plant control package 1 resulted in a 50% reduction of the values in the probability matrix, 
except for the zero bacteriological prevalence level (Urlings, 2007). Acidification of slaughter 
equipment in cleaning and disinfecting procedures under plant control package 2 results in an 
additional 50% reduction of the probability matrix values, again except for the zero bacteriological 
prevalence level, compared to plant control package 1. This results in higher probabilities for a 
bacteriological prevalence level of 0%. Adding logistic slaughter of sero-negative pig herds as control 
measure results in a probability matrix equal to that for control package 2, except for the zero 
serological herd prevalence level, in which the probability for a zero bacteriological probability is 1. 
                                                 
3  Within the “Control of Control program” Dutch slaughter companies seek to qualify for less intensive public control for 
food related hazards by inspectors of the government. The reduced costs of less public inspection are assumed to outweigh 
the costs of implementing and maintaining own control systems. The costs of logistic slaughter of Salmonella-free herd are 
estimated for the Dutch Vionfood company. The company has six plants in the Netherlands. It was considered not feasible 
to slaughter Salmonella-free herds at specific plants. Positively tested herds will be slaughtered at the end of the day.  Costs 
of logistic slaughter include an estimated 10 % increase in transportation costs. 
4 The authors wish to express their gratitude to Liz Alban from Danmark for providing the original data of this study.    16 
The probability distribution for package 1 has most of its probability mass at a bacteriological 
prevalence level of 0%. With higher serological herd prevalence levels the probability distribution is 
more dispersed with non-zero probabilities up to bacteriological prevalence levels of 80%.   
 
5. Solution Procedures 
General purpose MATLAB routines developed by Miranda and Fackler (2002: 155-188) were 
adapted to solve the producer’s stochastic discrete time/discrete state infinite horizon dynamic 
programming problem for a given set of parameters.  The program uses policy iteration to identify an 
optimal steady state control policy – i.e., the optimal Salmonella control package for each possible 
production history state.  The solution procedure also identifies the state transition matrix associated 
with the optimal policy, which can be used to determine a long-run probability for each possible state 
under the optimal policy.  This, in turn can be used along with the optimal policy to calculate expected 
control costs, testing costs, penalties, and prevalence levels for a representative producer operating 
under the optimal policy.  
In order to solve the slaughter plant manager’s problem of selecting an optimal plant control 
package and set of incentive system parameters, the producer problem for each system was embedded 
in a grid search program that systematically explored the relevant plant control package and incentive 
parameter space, as defined in table 3.   
The optimal parameters for the manager problem combined with the optimal producer control 
policy for those parameters, define a Nash equilibrium.  As noted in the description of the model, we 
consider two ownership structures – denoted IOF and COOP – as well as an efficiency benchmark for 
the production chain operations – denoted CHAIN.  The relevant performance measure for the manager   17 
depends on the ownership structure for the slaughter plant, and all the revenues and costs for the 
producer and the slaughter plant are readily calculated using the output from the producer model. 
 
6 Results 
 Nash equilibrium incentive system parameters and key performance measures for 
bacteriological threshold values BPREV*˛{0.5, 1.0, 1.5, …, 3.5} under each of the three ownership 
structures are presented in table 4. All expected performance measures are calculated using the 
producer’s optimal Salmonella control policies, the plant’s optimal Salmonella control policy and the 
associated steady state probabilities for each possible production history state. The dynamic 
programming solution identifies an optimal control package for each production history level and a 
steady state probability that a producer will be in each of the α1 + 1 possible production history states. 
Multiplying the costs of the optimal control package for each state by the associated steady state 
probability and summing over all α1 + 1 states yields the expected farm control cost.  
Changes in the bacteriological prevalence threshold level lead to changes in control actions, 
incentive parameter values, and performance results.  The producer always pays for testing costs under 
IOF and CHAIN ownership, and the slaughter plant pays for testing costs under COOP ownership.  
Farmer cost are high and farmer certainty equivalent of gain is low under IOF ownership. The pattern 
is reversed under COOP ownership, and intermediate values are taken under CHAIN ownership.   
The use of farm and plant control packages changes with varying bacteriological threshold 
levels, but is very similar across ownership structures. For bacteriological threshold values of 3.5% and 
3.0% , the optimal producer policy always calls for control package 1.   Lowering the bacteriological 
plant threshold from 3.5% or 3.0% to 2.5% induces more producers to use control package 2 with strict 
all-in/all-out procedures under all three ownership structures. Farm control package 2 is applied by all   18 
producers under the three ownership structures when the threshold values are 1.5% or 1.0%.  The 
increased use of farm control package 2 is induced by a higher value of the producer penalty parameter. 
Additional plant level control measures with acidification of slaughter equipment in cleaning and 
disinfecting procedures are in effect for all presented Nash equilibrium cases
5. For all ownership 
structures, plant control package 2 is implemented before farm control package 2 becomes part of the 
optimal solution.  
The farm serological threshold level decreases to 10% when the bacteriological threshold level 
falls to 0.5%, and the producer penalty remains high under all three ownership structures, inducing 
producers to use farm control package 3. The producer quality premium increases to allow for the use 
of farm control package 3 when the prevalence threshold value falls to 0.5 per cent. The cost 
effectiveness of farm control package 3, with a high probability of a zero seroprevalence, is related to 
the use of plant control package 3, with a probability of 100% for a zero bacteriological prevalence 
when the seroprevalence is zero.  Under all three ownership structures, plant control package 3 requires 
that all herds are tested and associated parameter values are 0 for the production history indicator level, 
1 for the maximum testing probability, and 0 for the testing probability reduction, thus making a static 
incentive system optimal when the bacteriological threshold is 0.5 per cent.   These expensive plant and 
farm control measures prevent a dramatic increase in expected penalties and result in a lower expected 
prevalence level. Expected welfare and monetary gains fall accordingly.   
The optimal values of the production history indicator level, maximum testing probability, 
testing probability reduction, producer penalty, and farm serological threshold are the same across all 
three ownership structures when bacteriological threshold values are 3.5% or 3.0%. The optimal values 
of the maximum testing probability and the optimal testing probability reduction parameter value are 0, 
resulting in zero testing costs. The optimal performance of the incentive system is not affected by 
                                                 
5 Only for bacteriological threshold values higher than 5.5 plant control package 1 is part of the optimal solution.   19 
changes in the serological threshold value, the producer penalty parameter, the producer share of 
testing cost, and the optimum value of the production history indicator level when bacteriological 
threshold values are 3.5% and 3.0%.  The producer quality premium shifts gains between producers 
and the slaughter plant without affecting risk. It is €0.80 per hog under IOF ownership.  Under COOP 
ownership, the producer premium decreases from €4.10 to €4.00 per hog when the bacteriological 
threshold decreases from 3.5% to 3..0%.  This allows the plant to pay the higher expected slaughter 
penalty associated with the lower threshold.  The optimal values of the producer quality premium range 
from €0.80 to €4.10 per hog and from €0.80 to €4.00 per hog when the threshold levels are 3.5% or 
3.0% under CHAIN ownership. Within these intervals, changes in the optimal producer quality 
premium simply result in transfers between the producers and the slaughter plant, but they do not affect 
the expected welfare gain for the chain. 
The producer history indicator level is 24 when the plant threshold level ranges from 2.5% to 
1.0%. The value of the producer penalty parameter is in the range €1.30-€1.70 per hog for 
bacteriological threshold levels from 2.5% to 2.0%, and the maximum testing probability ranges from 
0.47 to 0.57 under all three ownership structures. The testing probability parameter value is 0.10 or 
0.11 for a bacteriological threshold value of 2.5% and ranges from 0.04 to 0.06 for a threshold value 
2.0% under all thee ownership structures.  
The producer quality premium is low and in the range of €1.30-€1.50 per hog under IOF and 
CHAIN ownership for bacteriological threshold values ranging from 2.5% to 1.0%. It takes a high 
value just above €4.00 per hog under COOP ownership when plant threshold values are 1.5% or 
higher. This keeps the producer share of gains from Salmonella control high under COOP ownership. 
This effect is strengthened by the fact that producers pay all testing costs under IOF ownership, while 
the plant pays all testing costs under COOP ownership. With further lowering the bacteriological   20 
threshold value from 1.5% to 1.0%, the producer quality premium is partly shifted to the slaughter 
company to allow for paying the expected slaughter penalty under COOP ownership.  
The optimal serological threshold value for the producers is 30 under IOF and COOP 
ownership when the plant threshold ranges from 2.5% to 1.0% or less.  It increases to 40 when the 
plant threshold decreases from 2.5% or 2.0% to 1.5% or 1.0% under CHAIN ownership.  This seems 
counterintuitive, but more frequent use of farm level control package 2 is not induced by the 
serological farm threshold value but by the producer penalty parameter and the probability of being 
tested.  
 Because there is some uncertainty over testing costs under this incentive system, shifting this 
uncertainty to the risk neutral slaughter company lessens the risk borne by the risk averse producer. In 
turn, this reduces the risk premium in the system and so increases efficiency. The slaughter company 
does not bear testing costs under IOF ownership, however, because shifting risk to the producer makes 
it easier to induce the use of less risky, more effective control packages.  
Differences in the main performance measures, bacteriological prevalence and the welfare gain 
for the chain, are very small across ownership structures. Values of the expected monetary and welfare 
gains for the chain under IOF and COOP ownership are very close to those gains under CHAIN 
ownership.  Expected testing costs increase with a decreasing plant threshold but always remain under 
€0.036 per hog, except for a plant threshold level of 1.0% with testing costs of €0.10 per hog. The 
expected slaughter penalty increases to €0.944 when the plant threshold value fall to 1.0% under all 
ownership structures. A further decrease of the plant threshold value to 0.5% induces more stringent 
plant and farm control measures, with associated high expected control cost and the expected slaughter 
penalty falls accordingly.     21 
Changes in the bacteriological threshold level lead to substantial changes in performance 
measures.  Expected bacteriological Salmonella prevalence decreases by 56%, and expected overall 
welfare gains for the chain decrease by 17% when the plant threshold decreases from 3.5% to 1.5%.  
Expected bacteriological Salmonella prevalence decreases by 91%, and expected overall welfare gains 
for the chain decrease by 82% when the plant threshold decreases from 3.5% to 0.5%.  
 
7. Concluding comments 
This paper presents a dynamic principal-agent model for Salmonella control in the pork supply 
chain. Analysis based on this model clearly indicates the value of evaluating the cost effectiveness of 
plant and farm control measures, and trade-offs between prevalence reduction and related costs and 
gains for a wide range of prevalence threshold levels. Our results show that the optimal incentive 
system parameters and the overall performance in a supply chain can vary considerably with the 
bacteriological threshold level. 
It must be emphasized here that specific findings presented here depend on underlying 
behavioral and technical assumptions and on the particular sets of farm and plant control packages 
considered. While these findings might be reasonable for the Dutch pork supply chain, where slaughter 
companies seek to qualify for less intensive public control for food related hazards by inspectors of the 
government, slaughter plants in other EU member states may have different Salmonella prevalence 
levels.  
Both farm and plant control measures can be used to reduce Salmonella prevalence. The 
optimal values of the producer penalty parameter are lower in this study, compared to the earlier study 
of King, Backus and van der Gaag (2007), allowing plant control measures to be intensified first when 
plant threshold levels fall. It is also noteworthy that the cost effectiveness of farm control package 3 is   22 
strongly related to the use of plant control package 3.  It is therefore considered reasonable to assume 
that plant managers are honest in applying the incentive system parameters they choose when plant 
threshold levels are low.  
The need to simplify the analysis has resulted in at least three important limitations. First, 
although this analysis gives useful insights in the trade-offs between prevalence reduction and related 
costs and gains, it must be emphasized that for determining the appropriate bacteriological threshold 
level also public health aspects have to be considered. 
Second, in evaluating incentives for Salmonella control, the food safety externalities caused by 
joint production of quality attributes are often overlooked but may alter the willingness of a firm to 
adopt food safety controls (Roberts, 2005). 
Finally, plants using logistic slaughter are considered to test all herds for Salmonella and 
slaughter positively tested herds at the end of the day instead of at another location. Logistic slaughter 
only reduces the prevalence of Salmonella effectively when the delay between sampling pig herds at 
the farm and delivery to the slaughterhouse is at a minimum. In the future, the analysis could be 
extended to determine how the geographic distribution of plant capacity affects the choice between 
slaughtering positively tested herds at the end of the day instead or at another location. And with the 
development of faster testing technologies one might expect that production history performance 
information also contributes to the cost effectiveness of logistic slaughter.  
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Table 1. Expected Serological Prevalence for Salmonella Farm Control Packages 
 
Farm Control Package 
Serological prevalence  1  2  3 
    0  0.03  0.18  0.72 
   10  0.06  0.24  0.17 
   20  0.09  0.22  0.06 
   30  0.12  0.15  0.03 
   40  0.18  0.10  0.02 
   50  0.21  0.06  0.00 
   60  0.15  0.03  0.00 
   70  0.08  0.01  0.00 
   80  0.05  0.01  0.00 
   90  0.02  0.00  0.00 
  100  0.01  0.00  0.00 
       
Expected prevalence level (%)  45.1  21.6   4.6 
Variance of prevalence level  442.99  311.44  78.84 
Probability of exceeding 20% prevalence  0.82  0.36  0.05 
 
 
Table 2.  Bacteriological Prevalence Probability Distributions for Plant Control Package γ1. 
 
Bacteriological prevalence  0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Seroprevalence 0  0.95      0.05       0       0        0        0        0         0         0        0  0 
Seroprevalence 10   0.94  0.05       0.01   0        0        0        0         0         0        0  0 
Seroprevalence 20  0.927     0.053      0.015   0.005    0        0        0         0         0        0  0 
Seroprevalence 30  0.8978    0.0747     0.02    0.0075   0        0        0         0         0        0  0 
Seroprevalence 40  0.86792   0.09208   0.025   0.01     0.005    0        0         0         0        0  0 
Seroprevalence 50  0.818588 0.128912  0.03   0.0125   0.0075   0.0025   0         0         0        0  0 
Seroprevalence 60  0.78395   0.135      0.035   0.0225   0.015    0.0075   0.00105   0         0        0  0 
Seroprevalence 70  0.73255   0.14       0.06    0.035    0.015    0.0075   0.005     0.00495   0        0  0 
Seroprevalence 80  0.666     0.135      0.095   0.05     0.025    0.015    0.01      0.004     0        0  0 
Seroprevalence 90  0.63      0.105      0.09    0.065    0.05     0.03     0.015     0.01      0.005    0  0 
Seroprevalence 100  0.5817    0.08       0.08    0.075    0.06     0.05     0.035     0.025     0.0133   0  0    27 
 
Table 3. Allowable Parameter Values for the Slaughter Plant Optimisation Problem* 
 
 
Parameters  min  max  step size 
α0 – Producer quality premium  0.50  4.25  0.05 
α1 – Production history indicator level  1  24  1 
α2 – Maximum testing probability  0.00  1.00  0.01 
α3 – Testing probability reduction  0.00  0.20  0.01 
α4 – Minimum testing probability  0.00  0.50  0.10 
α5 – Producer share of testing cost  0.00  1.00  1.00 
α6 – Producer penalty  0.00  4.25  0.10 
α7 – Serological threshold value  0  30  10 
g(γ) –  Plant level Salmonella control  1  3  1 
 
* All pig herds are tested with a value of 1.00 for α2 and α4 and a value of 0.00 for α3 when plant 
control package γ3 is used.  28 
 
Table 4. Optimal Incentive System Parameters and Performance Measures (λ = 0.10 and dhogd = 50) 
 
 
  ￿-----------------------------Investor Owned Firm ------------------------------￿  ￿----------------------------------Cooperative -------------------------------------￿  ￿----------------------------------------Chain --------------------------------------------￿ 
Bacteriological threshold value  3.5  3.0  2.5  2  1.5  1  0.5  3.5  3  2.5  2  1.5  1  0.5  3.5  3  2.5  2  1.5  1  0.5 
Parameters                                           
α0 – Producer quality premium  0.80  0.80  1.05  1.30  1.40  1.40  3.55  4.10  4.00  4.10  4.15  4.15  3.35  4.05  [0.80-4.10]  [0.80-4.00]  1.90  1.30  1.50  1.50  4.00 
α1 – Production history indicator level  [0-24]  [0-24]  24  24  24  24  0  [0-24]  [0-24]  24  24  24  24  0  [0-24]  [0-24]  24  24  24  24  0 
α2 – Maximum testing probability  0.00  0.00  0.52  0.47  0.49  0.49  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.57  0.53  0.40  0.60  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.51  0.51  0.99  0.99  1.00 
α3 – Testing probability reduction  0.00  0.00  0.10  0.04  0.05  0.05  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.11  0.06  0.03  0.07  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.10  0.05  0.10  0.10  0.00 
α4 – Minimum testing probability  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
α5 – Producer share of testing cost  [0-1]  [0-1]  1  1  1  1  1  [0-1]  [0-1]  0  0  0  0  0  [0-1]  [0-1]  1  1  1  1  1 
α6 – Producer penalty  0.00  0.00  1.30  1.70  3.10  3.10  3.80  0.00  0.00  1.30  1.50  3.00  3.20  3.90  0.00  0.00  1.30  1.50  4.00  4.00  3. 70 
α7 – Serological threshold value  [10-40]  [10-40]  30  30  30  30  10  [10-40]  [10-40]  30  30  30  30  10  [10-40]  [10-40]  30  30  40  40  10 
g(γ) –  Plant level Salmonella control  2  2  2  2  2  2  3  2  2  2  2  2  2  3  2  2  2  2  2  2  3 
Performance Measures                                           
Expected bacteriological  prevalence  1.46  1.46  1.07  0.76  0.64  0.64  0.13  1.46  1.46  1.10  0.83  0.64  0.64  0.13  1.46  1.46  1.08  0.78  0.64  0.64  0.13 
Expected serological  prevalence  45.10  45.10  33.87  25.17  21.60  21.60  4.60  45.10  45.10  34.69  26.96  21.60  21.60  4.60  45.10  45.10  34.07  25.73  21.60  21.60  4.60 
Producer gain (€/hog)                                           
- producer quality premium  0.800  0.800  1.050  1.300  1.400  1.400  3.550  4.100  4.000  4.100  4.150  4.150  3.350  4.050  [0.800-4.100]  [0.800-4.000]  1.900  1.300  3.500  3.300  4.000 
- expected control cost  0.720  0.720  0.921  1.076  1.140  1.140  2.920  0.720  0.720  0.907  1.044  1.140  1.140  2.920  0.720  0.720  0.917  1.066  1.140  1.140  2.920 
- expected testing cost  0.000  0.000  0.018  0.034  0.027  0.027  0.100  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.018  0.036  0.019  0.019  0.100 
- expected penalty to plant  0.000  0.000  0.069  0.144  0.172  0.172  0.418  0.000  0.000  0.067  0.125  0.175  0.169  0.429  0.000  0.000  0.067  0.126  0.085  0.085  0.407 
- expected total cost  0.720  0.720  1.008  1.254  1.339  1.339  3.438  0.720  0.720  0.972  1.169  1.315  1.309  3.349  0.720  0.720  1.002  1.226  1.245  1.245  3.427 
- expected monetary gain  0.080  0.080  0.043  0.046  0.061  0.061  0.112  3.380  3.280  3.128  2.981  2.835  2.041  0.701  [0.080-3.380]  [0.080-3.280]  0.898  0.074  0.255  0.055  0.573 
Farmer certainty equivalent of gain  0.047  0.047  0.002  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.001  3.347  3.247  3.088  2.937  2.775  1.979  0.585  [0.047-3.347]  [0.047-3.247]  0.858  0.030  0.203  0.203  0.466 
Slaughter plant gain (€/hog)                                           
- slaughter plant price premium  4.250  4.250  4.250  4.250  4.250  4.250  4.250  4.250  4.250  4.250  4.250  4.250  4.250  4.250  4.250  4.250  4.250  4.250  4.250  4.250  4.250 
- slaughter plant control cost  0.100  0.100  0.100  0.100  0.100  0.100  0.400  0.100  0.100  0.100  0.100  0.100  0.100  0.400  0.100  0.100  0.100  0.100  0.100  0.100  0.400 
- quality premium paid to producers  0.800  0.800  1.050  1.300  1.400  1.400  3.550  4.100  4.000  4.100  4.150  4.150  3.350  4.050  [0.800-4.100]  [0.800-4.000]  1.900  1.300  1.500  1.500  4.000 
- expected penalty from producers  0.000  0.000  0.069  0.144  0.172  0.172  0.418  0.000  0.000  0.067  0.125  0.175  0.169  0.429  0.000  0.000  0.067  0.126  0.085  0.085  0.407 
- expected testing cost  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.018  0.032  0.028  0.025  0.100  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
- expected slaughter penalty  0.033  0.145  0.082  0.050  0.147  0.944  0.123  0.033  0.145  0.098  0.091  0.147  0.944  0.123  0.033  0.145  0.085  0.061  0.147  0.944  0.123 
Expected monetary slaughter gain  3.317  3.205  3.087  2.944  2.775  1.979  0.595  0.017  0.005  0.001  0.002  0.000  0.000  0.006  [3.317-0.017]  [3.205-0.005]  2.232  2.915  2.588  1.791  0.134 
Overall chain gain (€/hog)                                           
- slaughter plant price premium  4.250  4.250  4.250  4.250  4.250  4.250  4.250  4.250  4.250  4.250  4.250  4.250  4.250  4.250  4.250  4.250  4.250  4.250  4.250  4.250  4.250 
- expected farm control cost  0.720  0.720  0.921  1.076  1.140  1.140  2.920  0.720  0.720  0.906  1.044  1.140  1.140  2.900  0.720  0.720  0.917  1.066  1.140  1.140  2.920 
- slaughter plant control cost  0.100  0.100  0.100  0.100  0.100  0.100  0.400  0.100  0.100  0.100  0.100  0.100  0.100  0.400  0.100  0.100  0.100  0.100  0.100  0.100  0.400 
- expected testing cost  0.000  0.003  0.018  0.034  0.027  0.027  0.100  0.000  0.000  0.018  0.032  0.028  0.025  0.100  0.000  0.000  0.018  0.036  0.019  0.019  0.100 
- expected slaughter penalty  0.033  0.145  0.082  0.050  0.147  0.944  0.123  0.033  0.145  0.098  0.091  0.147  0.944  0.123  0.033  0.145  0.085  0.061  0.147  0.944  0.123 
- expected monetary gain for the chain  3.397  3.285  3.130  2.890  2.836  2.040  0.707  3.397  3.285  3.128  2.983  2.835  2.041  0.707  3.397  3.285  3.130  2.990  2.843  2.047  0.707 
Expected welfare gain for the chain  3.364  3.252  3.089  2.944  2.775  1.979  0.596  3.364  3.252  3.088  2.939  2.775  1.980  0.591  3.364  3.252  3.089  2.946  2.791  1.994  0.600 